## Framework

#### Prior to assessing the benefits of free speech we must determine how to make that assessment. Determining how to reach knowledge is a prior question.

**Woods**, Jay **and Roberts**, Bob **10**. *Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology (Advances in Cognitive Models & Arch)*. January 4, 2010. January 4, 2010. 1[[1]](#footnote-1)

The triviality of standard epistemology’s examples is due in part to the historical preoccupation with skepticism. If one cannot secure so simple a claim as “ I have two hands” or “ The world has existed for quite a while” against the mischief of evil demons and manipulative brain scientists, it makes little sense to worry about how we know difficult truths about the causes of the Second World War or the structure of DNA. Anti-skeptical maneuvers are a strong motif in the history of philosophy: Plato opposes the Sophists, Augustine the academic skeptics, Descartes Montaigne, Reid Hume, and Moore and Wittgenstein set themselves against skepticism inspired by Russell. However dominant anti-skepticism may be historically, some of epistemology’s most productive moments— in Aquinas, Kant, Plantinga— arose because philosophers were willing to set aside skeptical worries and look into what ordinary practitioners of science, religion, politics, and humanistic inquiry were willing to call knowledge. Intellectual virtues of the kind that interest Zagzebski and us seem likely to have relevance to high-end kinds of knowledge like scientific discoveries, the subtle understanding of difficult texts, moral self-knowledge, and knowledge of God, while being marginal to knowing, upon taking a look, that a bird is outside my window, or that what is in front of me is white paper. Given the central place of knowledge and understanding in human life, one would expect epistemology to be one of the most fascinating and enriching fields of philosophy and itself an important part of an education for life. We might expect that any bright university student who got all the way to her junior year without dipping her mind in an epistemology course would have to hang her head in shame of her cultural poverty. But the character and preoccupations of much of the epistemology of the twentieth century disappoint this expectation. We think that the new emphasis on the virtues and their relation to epistemic goods has the potential to put epistemology in its rightful place. And we hope that the present book, whatever its many shortcomings in detail, will suggest the rich ways in which epistemology-—the study of knowledge and related human goods— connects with ethical and political issues, with the practice of science and other forms of inquiry, with religion and spirituality, with appreciation of the arts, and with the enterprise of education.

**[They continue]**

Nicholas Wolterstorff distinguishes two kinds of epistemology, which he calls “analytic” and “regulative” . Analytic epistemology aims to produce theories of knowledge, rationality, warrant, justification, and so forth, and proceeds by attempting to define these terms. The English-speaking epistemology of the twentieth century is chiefly of this kind, and all of the virtue epistemologies of the last twenty-five years have been attempts to turn the intellectual virtues to the purposes of analytic epistemology. Regulative epistemology, which is the kind mostly practiced by Locke and Descartes and others of their period, does not aim to produce a theory of knowledge (though something like classical foundationalism does get produced as a by-product by Locke and Descartes). Instead, it tries to generate guidance for epistemic practice, “ how we ought to conduct our understandings, what we ought to do by way of forming beliefs” (p. xvi). Regulative epistemology is a response to perceived deficiencies in people’s epistemic conduct, and thus is strongly practical and social, rather than just an interesting theoretical challenge for philosophy professors and smart students. This kind of epistemology aims to change the (social) world. According to Wolterstorff, Locke’s regulative epistemology was a response to the social and intellectual crisis created by the breakup of medieval Christendom’s intellectual consensus. As Locke and others saw it, people’s intellectual lives needed to be reformed-— based on reason, rather than tradition or passions— because only thus could disagreements about the most fundamental issues, along with the resulting social conflicts, be resolved. But Locke also saw the need for reformation as perennial and genetically human: “I think there are a great many natural defects in the understanding capable of amendment.” Since “we are all short sighted” , seeing things from our own particular angle and not possessing comprehensive faculties, we need to learn the habit and inclination to consult others whose opinions differ from our own and read outside our discipline.21 In effect, Wolterstorff distinguishes two kinds of regulative epistemology, a rule-oriented kind and a habit-oriented kind (see pp. 152—4). Rule oriented epistemology, exemplified by Descartes’s Discourse on Method and Rules for the Direction of the Mind, provides procedural directions for acquiring knowledge, avoiding error, and conducting oneself rationally.22 By contrast, Locke’s regulative epistemology, as exemplified in Book IV of Ills Essay Concerning Human Understanding and Of the Conduct of the Understanding, aims less at the direct regulation of epistemic conduct than at the description of the habits of mind of the epistemicaily rational person. As Locke comments, Nobody is made anything by hearing of rules, or laying them up in his memory... and you may as well hope to make a good painter or musician, extempore, by a lecture and instruction in the arts of music and painting, as a coherent thinker, or a strict reasoner, by a set of rules, showing him wherein right reasoning consists. (Conduct, §4, p. 175) We need not rule-books, but a training that nurtures people in the right intellectual dispositions. Wolterstorff emphasizes that Locke focuses not on the belief-producing mechanisms or faculties that are native to the human mind, but instead on the ways in which such natural faculties are employed in more complex intellectual practices, which have a social dimension and are culturally shaped. Locke aims to reform that culture, to reshape the practices, and thus to foster in his contemporaries habits that support the reshaped practices. It is implicit in Locke’s discussions, and often explicit as well, that the habits in question are not mere habits, but virtues. Many habits are nothing more than skills— expertise in plying methods and techniques— but the habits that Locke describes are in many cases “ habits of the heart” , determinate dispositional states of concern, desire, and pleasure and pain, rather than mere habituated aptitudes. We will return to Locke when we take up the topic of intellectual practices in Chapter 5 The virtues epistemology of this book is a return to this tradition of the seventeenth century, to a regulative epistemology which, like Locke’s, describes the personal dispositions of the agent rather than providing direct rules o f epistemic action. It focuses on forming the practitioner’s character and is strongly education-oriented. The stress on intellectual virtues that has arisen among us is a start that can be felicitously developed in the regulative direction. Like Locke’s, our book is a response to a perception of deficiency in the epistemic agents of our time. But it is not a response to any particular historical upheaval or social crisis. We see a perennial set of deficiencies which in every generation need to be corrected, and a perennial positive need for formation in dispositions o f intellectual excellence. Our response to pluralism of belief systems differs from that of Locke and his fellow promoters of the life of “ reason” . Our regulative epistemology does not aim at quieting fundamental disagreement. Virtues presuppose one or another particular metaphysical or world-view background, and the prospect of securing universal agreement about that is dim. However, several of the virtues that we will discuss in Part II broaden minds and civilize intellectual exchange. The formation of excellent intellectual agents is clearly the business of schools and parents. They are the chief educators of character. But Locke and Descartes think that philosophers have a role as well, and we agree. What is that role, and how does it work? How do philosophers contribute to the regulation of intellectual character? The role that we picture for ourselves both resembles and diverges from the one that epistemologists in the twentieth century implicitly accepted for themselves.

Thus, effective decision making is that done in response to the demands of epistemic virtues.

#### The standard is consistency with virtuous decision making.

Clarification:

1. The framework is not saying we bring about better decision making in the future. Instead our judgment about the resolution should be shaped by consideration of virtuous decision making. We need to decide how thinking virtuously would lead one to legislate on the resolutional question.
2. The AC framework does not compete with the NC as the NC calls into question if we are well situated to determine the truth of the AC in the first-place argumentation.

## Contention

#### My thesis and sole contention is that affirming is inconsistent with virtuous decision making.

### Subpoint A

#### Sub Point A. The affirmative endorses one action for all public colleges and universities. This destroys space for experimentation and assumes we are epistemically situated to make a judgement about every school. Negating is thus a recognition of our own epistemic humility.

Posner 16. Eric Posner, 1-8-2016, "Campus Free Speech Problems Are Less Than Meets the Eye," Cato Unbound, https://www.cato-unbound.org/2016/01/08/eric-posner/campus-free-speech-problems-are-less-meets-eye, accessed 3-8-2017. NP

The intellectual basis of freedom of speech is epistemic humility—the notion that since we cannot be confident that we know the truth, we need to allow people to debate it. But then we must also acknowledge that we don’t and can’t know the best rules for promoting those debates. That’s why, in fact, the First Amendment allows people to form collectivities like newspapers, think tanks, and political parties where the institution itself embodies a certain viewpoint, and all who participate in the institution can be required to accept it (or at least pretend to accept it). We allow liberal newspapers and conservative newspapers rather than requiring all newspapers to publish diverse political views because we think that restrictions of speech within institutions may promote freedom of speech across institutions. The same logic applies to universities, whose leaders should be allowed to experiment in the same way. Lukianoff doesn’t see this because he imagines that free speech is a good in itself. In fact, freedom of speech is a means to an end, and our understanding of free speech must be derived from the end that we seek to achieve. In politics, that end is good governance and political competition. In education, that end is—education. The recent student demands for limitations on freedom of speech—demands that, as he concedes, put him in a “somewhat difficult position”—flummox Lukianoff because free speech is on both sides of the issue. Should he support the students because they exercise freedom of speech, or oppose them because they want to restrict it? He resolves this contradiction by, in effect, arguing that the students should be free to demand speech restrictions as long as universities refuse to submit. But that’s a cop-out. If you know in advance that no one will take seriously your speech, your right to freedom of speech is empty. However, in the Atlantic article that he coauthored with psychologist Jonathan Haidt, Lukianoff does make an argument against restrictions on campus speech based on a specific educational philosophy. Haidt and Lukianoff argue that efforts by students to restrict speech will, if accepted by universities and embodied in speech codes, cause psychological harm to students, and interfere with their education, by protecting them from dangerous ideas rather than forcing them to confront and understand them. The authors may be correct, but it is important to understand that they are taking a specific and contestable position on how universities should teach and how campus life should be regulated. The only way to know whether they are right or wrong is to allow universities to try different approaches, so that we can use evidence to determine which approach is best. Lukianoff the free speech advocate and Lukianoff the educational philosopher are on opposite sides of the question.

This turns the aff – 1) if minimal restrictions are optimal, schools will reach that consensus by experimentation and along the process realize any needed qualifications. 2) the aff, by being universal, functionally curtails the speech of those calling for restrictions rendering the aff self-defeating.

#### Further, this links directly to the standard because acting in accordance with epistemic humility is a primary epistemic virtue.

**Woods**, Jay **and Roberts**, Bob **10 2**. *Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology (Advances in Cognitive Models & Arch)*. January 4, 2010. January 4, 2010. 1[[2]](#footnote-2)

Our thesis is that intellectual humility fosters certain intellectual ends when it is conjoined, in a personality, with other epistemic virtues. Our claim is not that all people who lack humility will be in all respects epistemic failures; we even think that vanity, arrogance, and other antihumility vices can on occasion contribute to the acquisition, refinement, and communication of knowledge. Rather, we claim that in the long run, just about everybody will be epistemically better off for having, and having associates who have, epistemic humility. We have been doing conceptual analysis, but now our thesis is empirical. One can imagine a study in which investigators of various sorts are tested for their intellectual humility and this trait measure is correlated with accomplishments such as discoveries of new knowledge and purveyance of knowledge to others. If it turned out that epistemic humility was predictive of more of these epistemic goods than intellectual vices like vanity and arrogance, our hypothesis would be confirmed. If not, it would be disconfirmed. But the disconfirmation of that hypothesis would not, on our account, imply that intellectual humility was not a virtue, and that intellectual vanity and arrogance were virtues. The reason is that epistemic humility does not get all of its claim to virtue status from the narrowly intellectual advantages that we believe it affords. It is a virtue because the acquisition, maintenance, transmission, and application of knowledge are integral generic parts of human life, and a life characterized by humility with respect to these activities, as well as many other activities, is a more excellent life than one that lacks it. It is an intellectual virtue because it is exemplified in the context of intellectual practices. If the empirical study showed that humility led to a slightly lower output of epistemic goods, other traits being equal, than vanity and arrogance, we would be less than elated, but would not give up our claim that humility is an intellectual virtue and arrogance an intellectual vice. ‘‘Reliability’’ is not the only intellectual desideratum. Moore’s humility about his ideas would be intellectual humility even if it did not afford him any more epistemic payoff than the professor down the hall gets from his vanity and arrogance. Intellectual virtues, like their moral counterparts, are dispositions to proper human \functioning, and what counts as proper human functioning is determined by basic human nature. Virtues are traits of the person who is functioning as persons are supposed to function. If it did turn out that intellectual vanity and arrogance delivered, on average, more of the epistemic goods than intellectual humility, we would try to explain this disturbing result by reference to some other fault in the individual or some corruption in the epistemic environment. Perhaps individuals need vanity as a motivation, because their upbringing does not instill in them an enthusiasm for knowledge as such. Or we might locate the pathology socially— say, in the fact that the whole intellectual community is warped by vanity and arrogance, hyper-autonomy and unhealthy competitiveness, so that in that fallen community some vices actually become more ‘‘functional’’ than their counterpart virtues. Let us now try to make plausible the thesis that humility is intellectually advantageous to most of us in most of our actual intellectual environments. The humility that is the opposite of intellectual vanity and arrogance has the primarily negative role of preventing or circumventing certain obstacles to acquiring, refining, and transmitting knowledge. Vanity and arrogance are epistemic liabilities that beset many people, so the intellectually humble person stands out in his or her freedom from these impediments. Much acquisition, refinement, and communication of knowledge occurs in a live social setting whose mood and interpersonal dynamics strongly affect these intellectual processes. Research is often pursued by collaborative teams, and even scholars who spend most of their working days alone consult from time to time with colleagues and come together in professional meetings to share and test their findings. Classrooms are obviously social settings. Humility promotes these processes in two dimensions: in the functioning of the individual who possesses the virtue, and in the functioning of the social context with which he or she is interacting—colleagues, teachers, and pupils. The intellectually vain person is overly concerned with how she ‘‘looks’’ to the people who count; she wants to impress, and is very concerned not to look silly at conferences and in front of her bright students. She may be genuinely concerned to accomplish intrinsic epistemic ends: to figure out what’s what and to give her students a good education. But she also has the extrinsic concern to look good intellectually, and this is often a liability. By contrast, the lack of concern to look good frees the intellectually humble person to pursue intellectual goods simply and undistractedly (think of G. E. Moore). He has one obstacle less to the correction of his views, especially in public and ‘‘competitive’’ contexts like philosophy colloquia. The humble person will be free to test his ideas against the strongest objections. His humility may also make for intellectual adventure: he will not be afraid to try out ideas that others may ridicule (here if one lacks humility, courage may be a substitute). The intellectually arrogant person is inclined to act on a supposed entitlement to dismiss without consideration the views of persons he regards as his intellectual inferiors. Young ‘‘analytic’’ philosophers sometimes exemplify this vice vis-a-vis Continental or informal philosophy, just as ` young Continental philosophers sometimes suppose the profundity of their school to warrant dismissing the work of their analytic counterparts as superficial technical gamesmanship. Highly reputed older scientists may dismiss out of hand the unorthodox proposals of their graduate students or younger colleagues. Subramanyan Chandrasekhar was once asked why he was able to do innovative work in physics well past the age at which most people retire, while most physicists do their innovative work only when young. He said: For a lack of a better word, there seems to be a certain arrogance toward nature that people develop. These people have had great insights and made profound discoveries. They imagine afterwards that the fact that they succeeded so triumphantly in one area means they have a special way of looking at science which must be right. But science doesn’t permit that. Nature has shown over and over again that the kinds of truth which underlie nature transcend the most powerful minds.¹² In face of reality’s capacity to surprise even the smartest of us, a certain skepticism about one’s entitlement to disregard the views of minorities, of the unorthodox, and of the young may be a significant asset. As MacIntyre’s comments on Aristotle suggest, the humble inquirer has more potential teachers than his less humble counterparts. And this is due not just to numbers, but also to permeability of noetic structure: in interacting with persons whose minds are somewhat alien to his own, the strongly unarrogant person is better able, in the words of James Sterba, ‘‘to achieve the sympathetic understanding of [their] views necessary for recognizing what is valuable in those views and what, therefore, needs to be incorporated into [his] own views’’.

### Subpoint B

#### Subpoint B. Allowing schools to determine the content of accessible speech is key to respect and recognize expert authority.

**Simpson**, Robert **and** **Srinivasan Forthcoming**, Amia. *Academic Freedom* (ed. J. Lackey, In Oxford University Press). <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~corp1468/Research_&_Writing_files/No%20Platforming_FINAL.pdf>

In addition, the communicative norms and practices of universities also give recognized disciplinary experts – that is, academic faculty – various kinds of control over the speech of others, as is necessary to create and uphold the intellectual rigors of, and thus promote the epistemic aims of, their disciplines. In the public square we can tolerate the speech of flat-earth cranks, shills paid to undermine climate science, and revisionist historians who espouse conspiratorial misreadings of the evidence. As long as they don’t harass anyone we let them say their piece. 22 But such people are not owed the opportunity to teach History 101 or publish in scientific journals, any more than they are owed a platform to address parliament or a corporate board meeting. More specifically, it is permissible for disciplinary gatekeepers to exclude cranks and shills from valuable communicative platforms in academic contexts, because good teaching and research requires that communicative privileges be given to some and not others, based on people’s disciplinary competence. In short, academic disciplines amplify the speech of experts and routinely silence or marginalize the speech of others. Faculty set the curriculum, and students work within it. The professoriate – not students or the general public – decides which researchers have earned doctoral credentials. Editors of academic journals and presses exercise discretionary judgment to decide whose work will be published. As Post says, academic expertise is supported by such practices, which are not just about the freedom to inquire, but also about “affirmative disciplinary virtues of methodological care”, the maintenance of which “quite contradicts the egalitarian tolerance that defines the marketplace of ideas paradigm of the First Amendment” (2013: vii). And thus, whereas in free speech “there is an equality of status in the field of ideas”, the pursuit of knowledge in academia demands an inequality of status in ideas; it requires “practices that seek to separate true ideas from false ones” (Ibid: 9-10). The university would largely be a waste of time for teachers and students, and its subsidization a waste of resourcesfor the rest of society, were things to be otherwise. In short, communicative practices in universities are not governed by the general liberal precepts that regulate communication in the public square, and when universities do restrict speakers and viewpoints this should not be, and indeed is not, based solely (or even primarily) on purely procedural standards aimed at harm-prevention. Given that no platforming is a practice that takes place in universities, our question should be whether it is compatible with norms of academic freedom in particular, where these norms are understood as distinct from general liberal principles of free speech. Granted, some of the speaking engagements that no platformers target – like commencement addresses, or talks at student societies – are not immediately linked to the teaching and research activities that principles of academic freedom are there to safeguard. But principles of academic freedom are an appropriate reference point all the same, because such speaking events are an important part of the cultural and institutional backdrop against which teaching and research activities are conducted. The norms governing these communicative events – as well as attempts to interfere with them – should therefore be guided by consideration of how they affect the university’s core academic activities. What principles of academic freedom are primarily there to uphold, on the understanding we have sketched above, is a certain kind of independence: independence in the exercise of technical expertise in teaching and research from the control of outside actors, like governments, businesses, and administrators, who might try to force individuals or departments into “promulgating particular views” instead of “sustaining the ongoing scholarly discipline by which knowledge is identified and expanded” (Ibid: 89). The aim of these principles is to ensure, for instance, that donors cannot get professors fired for criticising foreign governments, that corporations cannot buy influence to quash research that threatens their commercial interests, that governments cannot gag scientists whose research reveals dangers created by government policies, and that administrative staff cannot force teachers to modify their syllabi based on the management’s ideas about what should be taught. In securing all these protections, though, to reiterate, principles of academic freedom do not guarantee teachers or students (or anyone else) participation in a wide-open discussion of ideas. On the contrary, the standards of expertise that govern teaching and research are compatible with all sorts of content-based restrictions on communication. What principles of academic freedom are meant to ensure is that such constraints are imposed by credentialed disciplinary experts, not outsiders, and that such constraints serve the promotion of disciplinary knowledge, not some ulterior agenda (Ibid: 85-93).

#### This links to the standard, properly recognizing the authority of local expertise is key to acting with true epistemic autonomy.

**Woods**, Jay **and Roberts**, Bob **10 3**. *Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology (Advances in Cognitive Models & Arch)*. January 4, 2010. January 4, 2010. 1[[3]](#footnote-3)

I can take it on authority that smoking is unhealthy or that whales are viviparous without prejudice to my intellectual autonomy, because it is not my business to understand such things deeply; but I can’t take it on authority that torture is wicked and still be thought an autonomous moral thinker, because it is everybody’s business to understand this much. But Benson seems to err in thinking that it is essentially morality that makes the difference in these cases. If I am a marine zoologist and I take it on authority that whales are viviparous, then I am short of intellectual autonomy; and in some areas of moral reasoning (say, where the issues are too technical for the layperson), it may be acceptable to base a moral judgment on authority. Intellectual and moral autonomy are not different in kind, because moral autonomy is a kind of intellectual autonomy—that is, it is autonomy as a moral thinker. The difference is that, generally speaking, moral understanding is required of everybody, but zoological understanding isn’t. Once we specify narrowly enough the context or role, we see that just as much self-sufficiency is required in the ‘‘intellectual’’ sphere as in the ‘‘moral’’. What makes, then, for autonomy with respect to knowledge gained from another? First, we would note that in one sense, the autonomy of the individual will vary from area to area of knowledge. No one is equally autonomous across all fields of knowledge. I may be rather autonomous within my specialty, but as soon as I get out of my depth, whether with respect to plumbing or microbiology, I become much more dependent on testimony and advice that I have only a rough ability to assess. So in this respect, autonomy is a matter of area-specific knowledge—certainly of propositional knowledge and of acquaintance, but above all of understanding as mediated by these and by reflection. Such understanding gives one a vantage point from which to assess evidence, organize and make use of new information, and thus have a certain ownership of the contents of one’s mind. It makes one less likely either to be swayed by contrary opinions, new information, intellectual fads, and social pressures to conform intellectually; or to dismiss such inputs out of hand—that is, without giving oneself adequate opportunity to see what merit they may harbor. Instead, one is in a position to process such inputs actively from one’s own point of view, to think for oneself. But autonomy vis-a-vis knowledge that comes from others is not just a matter of area-specific learning. Even in this limited (though very important) area, autonomy is more like a character trait than area-specific learning. It is a kind of wisdom about knowledge, a large-perspectival self-understanding with respect to the fields of learning. It is a practical wisdom such that the agent knows what she knows and knows the limits thereof, but also has enough general grasp of what is on the outer edge of her knowledge that she can figure out how to assess proposals there as an intelligent layperson. Such assessment will often involve consulting people who have more information and deeper understanding than herself, as well as books. Autonomy here is provided by having a feel for who these people and books are, enough humility not to mind seeking help from others, a bit of skill in putting the questions, enough understanding to grasp and assess what they say, and the self-confidence to venture judgments on the basis of these sources. So here autonomy is proper heteronomy. Specialized knowledge is no doubt an entree´ to this more generalized ability to size up and assimilate knowledge on the periphery of one’s expertise. It gives one insight into what it is really to know something, an insight that may beget both proper humility and a kind of generalized competence, both of which are aspects of intellectual autonomy. A person will not have developed this understanding, skill, self confidence, and humility without loving the epistemic goods. And she will love them in two ways. First, she will love them in the way that seeks confirmation and resolution and the holding of an understanding. Her will will have a teleology, and its aim will be knowledge; and this concern will tend to make her an independent thinker. But autonomy is also served by a sheer love of ideas, of reasoning, of thinking up schemata, of trying on ways of thinking. The dialectical versatility nurtured by such playfulness will serve the thinker well in thinking for herself, in making her own the knowledge that she gets from others—provided that her will is oriented by the more serious epistemic goal of truth. The individual who just enjoys being ‘‘creative’’ may seem even more autonomous than the one whose creativity is subordinated to a concern for truth; but this is an illusory and fantastic sort of autonomy, not the autonomy of the intellectually most virtuous agent. The other as critic Criticism is another way in which one person may guide another’s intellectual practice. A teacher comments on a student’s paper, pointing up faults and offering suggestions for the next draft. A professional literature colloquium consists, in part, in the members’ offering criticisms of one another’s comments and suggestions on how to extend an argument. In contexts of receiving criticism, autonomy sometimes involves resisting the criticism, sometimes accepting it; but in either case the agent may owe his increase of knowledge to the critic—and this happens at every level of sophistication and expertise, from the kindergarten to the professional physics or philosophy colloquium. The autonomous person has the presence of mind to judge evenly and rationally here. He is ready to assert himself, rather than accept criticism obsequiously; he is tenacious enough in his intellectual commitments to make the critic work hard, if that is warranted. But he is not defensive or proud to the point of rejecting criticism when he shouldn’t; he is open to criticism, and this is as much a mark of autonomy as proper tenacity is. Thus again we see that autonomy is not a matter of sheer independence, but of what one does with one’s dependence. Recently a student of one of us declined an honors project on a topic in which the professor was doing research, out of fear that his own ‘‘originality’’ would be swamped or stifled by the teacher’s greater expertise. He chose to do his project, instead, in an area where the professor had little expertise or interest. This choice, by an undergraduate (even a very bright one, as in the present case), is not an expression of intellectual autonomy, though the student may have thought of it in that way. Instead, the choice was made out of the undergraduate equivalent of what Harold Bloom calls ‘‘the anxiety of influence’’, an intellectual pathology that belongs in the general area of intellectual heteronomy (see Chapter 9 for more discussion). Practical wisdom, motivated by love of knowledge and freed by humility or supported by a bit of courage in the face of criticism, would more likely enjoin intellectual symbiosis with the professor and self-subordination to the professor’s interests and direction; and this would be an impressive age-appropriate autonomy in the undergraduate’s case. Autonomy for the student may involve more acquiescence in what the teacher says than autonomy in the professional philosopher involves acquiescence in what his critics say. But in both cases, autonomy involves a reasonable, active use of guidance from another.

This is empirically verified, the rise of an anti-expert bias is significantly impoverishing political discussion, which means I outweigh since this is a specially salient virtue for the government to currently act upon.

1. *Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology (Advances in Cognitive Models & Arch)*. January 4, 2010. January 4, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology (Advances in Cognitive Models & Arch)*. January 4, 2010. January 4, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. *Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology (Advances in Cognitive Models & Arch)*. January 4, 2010. January 4, 2010. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)